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PIAC (PEE IN A CUP)- THE NEW STANDARDIZED 
TEST FOR STUDENT-ATHLETES 
If you are a student-athlete in the United States, the SAT1 
might not be the only standardized test you take this spring. 
Throughout the country, public school student-athletes are also 
subject to random drug testing programs, even in the absence 
of actual suspicions. Despite United States Supreme Court 
precedent in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton2 allowing 
drug testing of students participating in extracurricular 
activities, parents and students continue to challenge the 
constitutionality of drug testing. This paper examines cases 
and constitutional challenges to student-athlete drug testing 
programs since the Supreme Court's decision in Vernonia. 3 It 
considers cases influencing the court decisions, and examines 
the analysis used by the courts in these cases determining the 
constitutionality of drug testing in schools. 
I. I'M POPULAR, I'M HIP. OF COURSE I'VE USED DRUGS~ 
In 2007, a news story reported that students who 
considered themselves popular were more likely to use drugs, 
drink, or smoke, than their peers who did not view themselves 
as popular.4 Very often, student-athletes are considered some 
of the most popular students in high school. This fact alone 
should cause concern among casual readers as well as school 
officials regarding the potentially prevalent use of drugs by the 
average high school student-athlete. 
The controversy surrounding drug use permeates the 
professional sports field today, 5 but this concern is not limited 
1. Scholastic Achievement Test. 
2. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 4 7J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
3. !d. 
4. Study: Teen Drug Use at Schools Worsens, NEWSMAJC.COM, Aug. 16, 2007, 
http:/ /archive. newsmax.com/archi ves/ic/2007 /8/16/111443. shtml. 
5. Watching ESPN's Sports Center during the months of January and February 
2009, a viewer is bombarded with stories about steroid use among professional baseball 
players. See Mike Wise, One Name is Not Enough in this Case, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 
2009, at EOl. 
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to the professional arena. In 1993, more than 250,000 
adolescents admitted to steroid use.6 Later, in 1999 the 
American Medical Association reported that 2% of high school 
students admitted using steroids. That percentage rose to 4% 
in 2002 and 6%) in 2003.7 Today, that percentage realistically is 
even higher as more than 50%) of high school students admit to 
having tried an illicit drug of some sort, and three out of ten 
have used a drug other than marijuana by the end of high 
school. 8 Of particular concern is the rise in use of anabolic 
steroids, tranquilizers, and barbiturates by students, along 
with the dramatic rise in illegal, non-medical use of Oxycontin 
and Vicodin. 9 
To combat the drug problem among students, many schools 
have initiated random drug testing programs aimed at 
students, and more specifically at student-athletes. In fact, 
according to a nationwide study published in the May 2008 
American Journal of Public Health, one in seven public school 
districts randomly drug test their students, up· nearly 50% from 
five years earlier. 10 By randomly singling out some of the most 
visible and popular students-student-athletes-these 
programs are designed to catch and punish offenders, as well 
as to deter general drug use. Despite growing prevalence of 
drug testing, nonetheless, the American Academy of Pediatrics 
warns that school-based drug testing may "decrease student 
involvement in extracurricular activities and undermine trust 
6. Eugene C. Bjorklun, Drug Testing High School Athletes and the Fourth 
Amendment, 83 EDUC. L. REP. 913, 914 (1993). 
7. Christopher Lawlor, New Jersey Institutes Statewide Steroid- Testing for High 
School Athletes, USA TODAY, June 15, 2006, 
http://www. usatoday.com/sports/preps/2006-06-07-nj-steroid-testing_x. htm; Cynthia 
Sysol, Constitutional and Indispensable Legislation: Mandatory Random Steroid 
Testing for High School Athletes, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 597, 597 (Oct. 2008). 
8. Joseph R. McKinney, The Effectiveness and Legality of Random Student Drug 
Testing Policies, 184 EDUC. L. REP. 669, 669 (2004). 
9. Id.; see also U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Monitoring the Future 
Survey Shows Decrease in Use of Marijuana, Club Drugs, Cigarettes and Tobacco, Dec. 
2002, http://www.nida.nih.gov/Newsroom/02/NR12-16.html; U.S. Dep't of Health and 
Human Servs., Monitoring the Future Survey Shows Continued Decline in Drug Use by 
Students, Dec. 2005, http://www.nida.nih.gov/newsroom/05/NR12-19a.html; see also 
Charles Feeney Knapp, Drug Testing and the Student-Athlete: Meeting the 
Constitutional Challenge, 76 IOWA L. REV. 107, 107-08 (Oct. 1990) (comprehensively 
explaining that drug use by athletes has a greater probability of reaching epidemic 
proportions than non-athletic drug abuse). 
10. KEVIN ZEESE, DRUG TESTING LEGAL MANUAL, § 8:4 (West 2d ed. 2008). 
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between pupils and educators." 11 Additionally, physicians warn 
that there is little evidence of the effectiveness of these types of 
drug testing regimes. 12 
II. STUDENT RIGHTS AGAINST SEARCHES IN SCHOOL: A PRIMER 
Students do not have full constitutional rights while at 
school, but they are not stripped of all of their rights, either. So 
where on this spectrum of rights do students fall? In the past 
the United States Supreme Court observed, "[i]t can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights. . . at the schoolhouse gate." 13 More 
recently, however, the Court state, 
Traditionally at common law, and still today, unemancipated 
minors lack some of the most fundamental rights of self-
determination--including even the right of liberty in its 
narrow sense, i.e., the right to come and go at will. They are 
subject, even as to their physical freedom, to the control of 
their parents or guardians. . . When parents place minor 
children in private schools for their education, the teachers 
and administrators of those schools stand in loco parentis 
over the children entrusted to them. In fact, the tutor or 
schoolmaster is the very prototype of that status. 14 
A. Constitutional Protections Against Unreasonable Search and 
Seizure 
Searches by public school officials, such as the collection of 
urine samples, implicate constitutional interests and 
protections. While there are possible Fourteenth Amendment 
considerations concerning due process, the primary 
constitutional concern centers on the Fourth Amendment 
considerations. 15 The Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
11. Id. 
12. Id.; see also Robert Taylor, Compensating Behavior and the Drug Testing of 
High School Athletes, 16 THE CATO J. 351, 351-52 (Winter 1997), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journallcj 16n3-5.html (providing an example of an empirical 
study regarding the effectiveness of drug testing). 
13. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
14. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654·55 (1995). 
15. BjorkJun, supra note 6, at 915. 
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their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures ..... "16 
Application of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
protection to the public school setting has a history beyond the 
immediate realm of drug testing. New Jersey u. T.L.O., sets the 
standard for searches of students and student property in 
schools. 17 In T.L. 0. the Supreme Court upheld the school 
official's physical search of a student and her possessions, 
where the official incidentally discovered marijuana, because 
the school had a "reasonable suspicion" that the student had 
been smoking at school. 18 The current law for school searches 
of students and student property calls for school personnel to 
perform searches upon "reasonable," 19 "individualized 
suspicion;"20 the search must be both justified at inception,21 
and reasonable in scope.22 
B. Drug Testing in the Courts, pre-Vernonia School District 47J 
u. Acton 
One of the earliest cases, occurring in the 1980s, dealt with 
the legality of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) drug testing college athletes.23 In this case the 
Supreme Court found no Fourth Amendment implications 
because it viewed the NCAA as a private party, at odds with 
the state, and therefore not a state actor.24 This precedent does 
little to shed light on the drug testing situation in public 
schools because a public school district is clearly not a private 
party, but rather a state actor obligated to act within Fourth 
Amendment restrictions. In another 1980s case the Supreme 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
17. N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
18. ld. at 347-48. 
19. Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 600 (2d Cir. 2006) (overruling a district 
court decision permitting a strip search based on facts, reports, and observations, but 
finding that reasonable belief is less than probable cause). 
20. DesRoches v. Caprio, 156 F.3d 571, 574 (4th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that to 
avoid sweeping searches reasonable suspicion should exist, however, this does not 
apply in random searches). 
21. That is, did reasonable and individualized suspicion exist to warrant the 
search at the time the search began? 
22. Based on the reasonable suspicion and inception of the search was the search 
reasonable for what the administrator was searching for? Did it fit the need? 
23. Nat'! Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). 
24. ld. at 196. 
-------------------~--
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Court considered drug testing in the employment context. The 
Court stated, "Because it is clear that the collection and testing 
of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has 
long recognized as reasonable . . . these intrusions must be 
deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment."25 
In T.L.O., the landmark school search and seizure case, the 
Supreme Court observed in a footnote, "[A]lthough 'some 
quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to 
a constitutional search or seizure[,] ... the Fourth Amendment 
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion."'26 It 
seems reasonably clear that under T.L. 0. and other student 
search cases that searches of individual students for drugs, 
based on reasonable suspicion, would most likely be justified. 27 
Even after understanding the law regarding searches in 
schools generally, other questions remain. For example, may 
schools indiscriminately and randomly test all students for 
drugs? Lower courts originally reviewed early drug testing 
policies in schools. In Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford 
Regional School District, a New Jersey court struck down a 
school policy requiring all students to consent and submit to 
urinalysis as a condition of enrollment. 28 This was followed by 
Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated Independent School 
District, a case in which a Texas court struck down a policy 
reqmrmg drug testing for all students enrolled in 
extracurricular activities, due to lack of evidence that drugs 
and drug abuse were problems.29 
C. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, Establishing the 
Constitutionality of Random Drug Testing of Students 
In 1995, the Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari to decide whether a school district's random 
25. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989). 
26. N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985) (citing United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976)). 
27. See Nancy J. Fiatt-Moore, Public Schools and Urinalysis: Assessing the 
Validity of Indiana Public Schools' Student Drug Testing Policies After Vernonia, 1998 
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 239, (discussing student rights in school, and the early search 
cases). 
28. Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Reg'! Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d 709, 711-13 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985). 
29. Brooks v. E. Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 766 (S.D. 
Tex. 1989), aff'd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991). 
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urinalysis drug testing of student-athletes violated the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. 30 The district court had 
dismissed the student's complaint, yet the Ninth Circuit 
reversed and held that the policy was unconstitutional. 31 In a 
six to three decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit and found the policy constitutional.32 The Court 
balanced the intrusion on the student's Fourth Amendment 
interests against the school district's legitimate interests in 
preventing drug use and reasoned that this narrowly directed 
policy was permissible.33 
In Vernonia, a logging community in Oregon, school sports 
play a prominent role. 34 In the 1980s, drug use increased, and 
"athletes were the leaders of the drug culture."35 This rise in 
drug use caused countless problems, including: increases in the 
number of disciplinary referrals and suspensions, 36 severe 
sports-related injuries,37 as well as overlooked safety 
precautions at sporting events. 38 To combat drug use, the 
district added educational courses on drugs and drug use and 
used drug-sniffing dogs on campus, but by then the problems 
had reached "epidemic proportions."39 
The policy implemented by the school district in Vernonia 
required all student-athletes and their parents to sign a release 
form granting consent for the testing of the student-athlete.40 
All students were tested at the beginning of their sport's 
season. Throughout the season, 10% of the athletes were 
selected randomly for testing each week.41 The urine samples 
were collected individually from each student and monitored by 
a same gendered adult in the student locker room.42 The school 
sent samples to an independent lab and tested for presence of 
30. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995). 
31. /d. at 652. 
32. /d. (O'Connor dissenting, joined by Stevens and Souter). 
33. !d. at 646. 
34. /d. at 648. 
35. !d. at 649. 
36. !d. at 648. 
37. !d. at 649. 
38. /d. 
39. Id. 
40. !d. at 650. 
41. !d. 
42. !d. 
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illegal drugs.43 "Only the superintendent, principals, vice-
principals, and athletic directors ha[ d] access to test results."44 
Students who failed were immediately tested again. Upon a 
second failed test, the students received the option to either 
participate in "an assistance program that includes weekly 
urinalysis," or face suspension from "the current season and 
the next athletic season."45 The policy specifically targeted 
athletes who played sports "where the risk of immediate 
physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he is 
playing his sport is particularly high."46 The stated purpose of 
the policy was to de-glamorize drug use.47 
James Acton, a seventh-grade football player, and his 
parents, refused to sign the testing consent forms. 48 The school 
subsequently denied him participation on the school football 
team.49 The Acton family requested declaratory and injunctive 
relief from enforcement of the policy, arguing it violated the 
United States Constitution and the Oregon Constitution.50 
Since a urine drug test administered by a public school is a 
search of a student by a state official, students have Fourth 
Amendment protections; these protections are tempered, 
however by the student's unique standing as a child enrolled in 
a public school. 51 The ultimate measure of constitutionality of a 
governmental search is "reasonableness;" to determine 
reasonableness, the Court balanced the intrusion on the 
student's Fourth Amendment interests against the legitimate 
governmental interests promoted by the random drug test. 52 In 
determining "reasonableness," the Court realized that it could 
not "disregard the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility 
for children."53 
43. !d. 
44. !d. at 651. 
45. !d. 
46. !d. at 662. 
4 7. !d. at 650 (stating that one of the purposes of the policy was "to prevent 
student athletes from using drugs"). 
48. !d. at 651. 
49. !d. 
50. !d. at 651-52. 
51. /d.at 652, 654 ("Central, in our view, to the present case is the fact that the 
subjects of the Policy are (1) children, who (2) have been committed to the temporary 
custody of the State as schoolmaster."). 
52. !d. at 652-53. 
53. !d. at 656 (Recognizing the importance of considering the search in light of the 
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While engaged in balancing the student-athlete's 
expectation of privacy with the school's legitimate interest in 
drug testing, the Court analyzed the unique position of 
student-athletes. Due to factors like "suiting up" before 
practices and communal locker rooms, student-athletes enjoy 
less privacy interests than other students. 54 The Court also 
found the fact that students who participate in athletics 
"voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even 
higher than that imposed on students generally highly 
instructive."55 
One issue of potential privacy troubled the Court to some 
degree, but not enough to change the outcome. The Court noted 
that students were required to identify in advance any 
medications they were taking, otherwise risking a false positive 
test.56 While this requirement made the test more intrusive, 
the Court found that the limited personnel with access to the 
information made the policy not such an invasion of privacy as 
to invalidate the entire scheme.57 
The Court determined that the school district had an 
interest "important enough to justify" the drug testing policy in 
light of the level of privacy interest of the student-athletes. 58 In 
considering the nature of the school district's interest, the 
Court stated, "Deterring drug use by our Nation's 
schoolchildren is at least as important as enhancing efficient 
enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of 
drugs."59 The Court also reasoned that the "physical, 
psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe" 
during school years.60 The opinion recognized and approved of 
the narrow tailoring of this drug testing program, finding it 
was directed at deterring drug use by student-athletes "where 
school environment and unique role of the public school, the court cited N.J. v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. at 339, "[A] proper educational environment requires close supervision of 
schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be 
perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult."). Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655. 
54. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657. 
55. Id. (noting that in Vernonia, like in many districts, students participating in 
athletics have to submit to preseason physical exams). 
56. Id. at 659. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 661. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
1] PEE IN A CUP 171 
the risk of immediate physical harm to the drug user or those 
with whom he is playing his sport is particularly high."61 
The drug problem in Vernonia was of special importance to 
the Court, which called it an "immediate crisis" and reasoned 
that it was "self-evident that a drug problem largely fueled by 
the 'role model' effect of athletes' drug use . . . is effectively 
addressed by making sure that athletes do not use drugs."62 
While the student's parents in this case argued for a less 
intrusive method, such as "testing on suspicion of use" only,63 
the Court noted: "We have repeatedly refused to declare that 
only the 'least intrusive' search practicable can be reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment." 64 Thus, in light of the 
students' "decreased expectation of privacy, the relative 
unobtrusiveness of the search," and the legitimate interests 
shown by the school district, the random drug testing policy 
was reasonable and constitutional.65 
Vernonia was not, however, a unanimous decision by the 
Supreme Court. While Justice Ginsburg joined the opinion, she 
also wrote her own short concurrence.66 Justice Ginsburg noted 
a relationship between the students being tested-those who 
voluntarily participate in extracurricular athletics-and the 
most severe punishment-suspension from extracurricular 
athletics. 67 Justice Ginsburg also used her concurrence to 
clarify her understanding that the majority opinion reserved 
the question of whether districts could perform mandatory 
testing on all students for another day. 
Justice O'Connor penned the dissent, joined by Justices 
Stevens and Souter.68 She dissented because the Court's 
decision did not require individualized suspicion, and she felt 
the majority failed to adequately explain why individualized 
suspicion was unnecessary in the context of student-athlete 
61. Id. at 662. 
62. Id. at 663. 
63. Id. at 665 (noting that the majority of Vernonia parents overwhelmingly 
supported the plan, and that the record showed no objection to the program by any 
other parents other than the Acton family). 
64. Id. at 663. 
65. Id. at 664-65. 
66. ld. at 666. 
67. Id. 
68. ld. 
172 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2010 
testing.69 In summary, Justice O'Connor argued that because 
the school district already had in place a discipline system 
based on individualized suspicion/0 and the district had "first-
or second-hand stories of particular, identifiable students 
acting in ways that plainly gave rise to reasonable suspicion of 
in-school drug use," the district could easily impose a suspicion-
based drug testing program that would not intrude on any 
student's Fourth Amendment rights.7 1 
Ill. VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 47J V. ACTON: THE FINAL 
WORD IN SCHOOL DRUG TESTING? I THINK NOT. A LOOK AT THE 
CASES THAT HAVE FURTHER DEFINED THE LIMITS OF DRUG 
TESTING IN SCHOOLS 
Following Vernonia, litigation regarding random drug 
testing in schools has continued at all levels. 72 Student and 
parent plaintiffs have argued that state constitutions provide 
greater protections than the Federal Constitution, and that 
schools lack the "special need" to invade student privacy. As 
demonstrated in this section, when balancing student privacy 
rights and school interests in maintaining healthy and safe 
environments, state and federal courts have not arrived at 
consistent decisions regarding these issues. 
A. The United States Supreme Court Overturns a Tenth Circuit 
Holding that Drug Testing Violates Student's Fourth 
Amendment Rights 
In June 2002, the United States Supreme Court held as 
constitutional a policy requiring drug testing of all students 
participating in extracurricular activities at the middle school 
and high school levels. 73 Initially, a federal district court held 
that while the school district did not demonstrate that the drug 
69. !d. at 668-86. Justice O'Conner notes specifically in her dissent that "[o]ne 
searches today's majority opinion in vain for recognition that history and precedent 
establish that individualized suspicion is 'usually required' under the Fourth 
Amendment ... . "Id. at 676. 
70. Id. at 677-79. 
71. !d. at 679. 
72. Since Vernonia, there have been decisions at all levels regarding drug testing 
in schools: the U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. Court of Appeals, and State Supreme Courts. 
73. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 
U.S. 822, 825 (2002). 
- -~ ------------------
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problem had reached epidemic levels, "special needs" existed in 
the public school setting that supported the policy.74 The Tenth 
Circuit reversed the decision, reasoning that the school district 
failed to show an identifiable drug abuse problem among a 
sufficient number of the extracurricular students to justify 
testing as a remedial measure.75 
In the fall of 1998, a school district in Tecumseh, Oklahoma 
adopted a Student Activities Drug Testing Policy.76 The policy 
required all middle and high school students to consent to 
urinalysis testing for drugs before participating in any 
extracurricular activity. 77 Students were also required to 
permit random drug testing while participating in that 
activity. 78 Additionally, to the policy required students to agree 
to be tested at any time upon "reasonable suspicion."79 The 
drug testing was designed to detect only the use of illegal 
drugs, not medical conditions or authorized prescription 
medications.80 Students and their parents sued the district, 
claiming that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. 81 The 
Supreme Court reviewed the district's policy for 
"reasonableness."82 The Court noted that it had previously held 
that '"special needs' inhere in the public school context," 
lessening the burden the government must show in justifying a 
74. Earls v. Bd. ofEduc. ofTecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1286-
87 (2000), reu'd, 242 F.3d 1264 (lOth Cir. 2001), reu'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (holding that 
there was a history of drug abuse starting in 1970 presenting a legitimate cause for 
concern). 
75. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d 1264, 1270 (2001), 
reu'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (holding that the School District failed to demonstrate a 
sufficient drug problem among students participating in extracurricular activities to 
justify the policy). 
76. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 536 U.S. at 826. 
77. Id. In practice, however, the policy was only applied to students' participation 
in competitive extracurricular activities sanctioned by the Oklahoma Secondary 




81. ld. at 826-27. 
82. Id. at 828. Normally, the Court determines reasonableness by balancing the 
nature of the intrusion on the individual's privacy against the promotion of a legitimate 
governmental interest, but, in the context of safety, a search may be reasonable when 
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and 
probable-cause requirement impracticable." ld. at 829 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 
483 u.s 868 (1987)). 
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search of students. 83 The first factor the Court considered was 
"the nature of the privacy interest" of the students, balanced 
against the school's interest in maintaining the discipline, 
health, and safety of students. The Court concluded that the 
students affected by this policy had a limited expectation of 
privacy because students who voluntarily participate in school 
extracurricular activities have reason to expect intrusions upon 
their rights and privileges.84 
As a second factor, the Court analyzed the "character of the 
intrusion imposed by the Policy," requiring a fact-specific 
inquiry into "the manner in which production of the urine 
sample is monitored."85 The Court found that the policy was 
"minimally intrusive" and limited in its uses, concluding "that 
the invasion of the students' privacy [was] not significant."86 
Finally, as a third factor, the Court addressed the "nature and 
immediacy" of the district's concerns and the "efficacy of the 
Policy in meeting [those concerns]."87 The Court held that 
testing of "students who participate in extracurricular 
activities is a reasonably effective means of addressing the 
school district's legitimate concerns in preventing, deterring, 
and detecting drug use." For these reasons, the policy satisfied 
this third and final prong.88 
B. The Seventh Circuit Upholds Suspicionless Drug Testing for 
Students Participating in Extracurricular Activities and 
Student Drivers 
In 2000, the Seventh Circuit Court affirmed an Indiana 
District Court decision that students participating in 
extracurricular activities or driving to school may be subject to 
random, suspicionless drug and alcohol testing. Five students 
initially brought suit alleging that the drug testing policy 
83. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottowatomie County v. Earls, 536 
U.S. 822, 829 (2002). 
84. ld. at 830-32. 
85. ld. at 832. 
86. Id. at 833-34 (describing protocol where the monitor waits outside the 
restroom stall listening for urination sounds, the results are kept confidential and 
separate from other educational records, results are not turned over to law 
enforcement, and the only consequence of a failed test is limiting the student's 
privilege of participating in extracurricular activities). 
87. ld. at 834. 
88. ld. at 837. 
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passed by the Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation in 1998 
violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable 
search and seizure.89 The Indiana District Court held that the 
policy was constitutional. 90 The Seventh Circuit determined 
that it was bound by the principle of stare decisis to follow its 
1997 ruling in Todd u. Rush County Schools upholding a 
similar policy_9 1 Following this decision, the court ruled this 
policy was constitutional as well. 
In 1998, Penn-Harris-Madison instituted a drug testing 
policy for its students.92 The policy focused on five groups of 
students, including: student drivers, students who participate 
in extracurricular activities, students who volunteer to be 
tested, students who have been suspended for three or more 
consecutive days, and students for which there is a reasonable 
suspicion.93 To justify the implementation of its policy, Penn-
Harris-Madison relied on Todd.94 In Todd, the district 
demonstrated that drug use was a problem on the rise on the 
rise within the district.95 The disputed policy in Todd tested 
students in extracurricular activities because they act as role 
models and because of serious health risks associated with 
drug use. 96 Unlike the school district in Todd, however, Penn-
Harris-Madison did not show evidence of a pervasive drug 
problem or prove any correlation between drug use and student 
involvement in extracurricular activities. 97 
The Seventh Circuit applied Todd and noted that Penn-
Harris-Madison failed to show a "special need" justifying the 
testing of students.98 Nevertheless, the court determined it was 
bound by principles of stare decisis to follow its ruling in Todd 
upholding a similar policy. 99 The court ruled the Penn-Harris-
89. Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2000). 
90. ld. at 1054. 
91. Todd v. Rush County Sch., 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 1998) (The court in Todd 
relied on Vernonia, the court held that the school district established a "special need" 
justifying the intrusiveness of the drug policy). 
92. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1053-54. 
93. ld. at 1055. 
94. ld. at 1062. 
95. ld. at 1061. 
96. ld. 
97. ld. at 1066 (Penn-Harris-Madison admitted that the ultimate goal was to 
prevent drug use by testing all students on a random suspicionless basis). 
98. ld. at 1067. 
99. ld. at 1066. 
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Madison policy also constitutional. 100 The court did not, 
however, explain its ruling in Todd, and acknowledged no 
factual differences between the two cases. 
C. The Indiana Supreme Court Reverses the Court of Appeals 
and holds a Drug Testing Policy Constitutional under the 
Indiana State Constitution 
In 2002, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed a court of 
appeals decision in Linhc u. Northwestern School Corp., and 
reinstated the decision of the trial court upholding a random 
drug testing policy. 101 The trial court originally upheld the 
policy, ruling that the drug testing policy was reasonable. 102 
The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding 
that because the state constitution provides greater protection 
against unwarranted drug testing than the Federal Fourth 
Amendment, drug testing students without individualized 
suspicion violated the Indiana Constitution. 103 On petition to 
transfer, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed the decision 
back to the original district court holding. 104 
In Linke, the Northwestern School Corporation (NSC) 
instituted a drug testing policy in January 1999. The random 
urinalysis testing policy was designed to protect the health and 
safety of the students, and to improve the image of NSC in the 
community. The drug testing policy resulted from a task force 
designed to examine the district's approach to drugs in the 
school. 105 The drug testing policy applied to all middle school 
and high school students participating in school athletics, 
specified extracurricular and co-curricular activities, as well as 
student drivers who parked on campus. 106 A computer selected 
students to be tested and students received no advance 
100. !d. at 1067. 
101. Linke v. Nw. Sch. Corp., 763 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2002). 
102. Id. at 976-77. 
103. Linke v. Nw. Sch. Corp., 734 N.E.2d 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) rev'd, 763 
N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2002). 
104. !d. 
105. Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 975. In 1998-1999, two suspensions and two expulsions 
at high school, five suspensions and five expulsions at the middle school, and a 1996 
death by drug overdose by a student who bought drugs at school from a fellow student. 
106. !d. Students who did not want to be tested would have to skip public 
performances in their co/extracurricular activities, but could complete alternative 
assignments for credit. 
1] PEE IN A CUP 177 
warning; they were then taken to a separate trailer, one at a 
time, and were able to complete the test alone. 107 The specimen 
was tested only for substances banned by the district. 108 
In upholding the policy, the Indiana Supreme Court 
considered the policy under both the Federal Fourth 
Amendment and the Indiana Constitution. The lower court had 
relied on a prior case requiring "individualized suspicion" 
before a police officer could stop a motorist for a seatbelt 
violation. 109 Despite this precedent, the Indiana Supreme 
Court distinguished a search conducted to enforce the law from 
one conducted by a school, noting the different roles played by 
law enforcement and teachers. 110 The court also noted that the 
results of the drug tests were not volunteered to law 
enforcement and not used for internal disciplinary functions. 111 
The court found that "balancing the students' interests against 
the school corporation's [interests], better comport[ed] with [a] 
totality of circumstances framework than with a per se 
requirement of individualized suspicion." 112 
In evaluating this policy, the court found persuasive the 
lessened student privacy interests, school custodial and 
protective interests in their students, and the fact that the 
policy was created with parent involvement as an element of a 
comprehensive interdiction program. 113 The higher than 
average rate of drug use at these schools, the drug related 
death, and the continued presence of drugs also strongly 
influenced the court's decision. 114 Thus, in light of the totality 
of the circumstances, the court stated that the policy did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment or the Indiana Constitution. 115 
107. Linke, 734 N.E.2d at 254. 
108. Id. 
109. Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 337 (Ind. 1999). 
llO. Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 978. 
lll. Id. 
112. Id. 
ll3. Id. at 985. 
114. Id. 
ll5. Id. 
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D. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court holds Drug Testing of 
Students in Extracurricular Activities and Student Drivers as 
Violating the Pennsylvania Constitution 
In 2003, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down a 
Delaware Valley School District's random, suspicionless drug 
testing policy. 116 The policy tested not only student-athletes, 
but also students participating in any extracurricular activity 
and students applying for parking permits. 117 In 1999, parents 
brought suit alleging the policy violated the students' state 
constitutional right against search and seizure, and the 
parents' fundamental right to make health care decisions for 
their children. 118 The trial court ruled that since comparable 
intrusions were upheld by Pennsylvania courts in the past, the 
students' claim failed as a matter of law. 119 The court also 
rejected the parental rights claim. 120 The state appellate court 
affirmed the dismissal of the parental rights claim, but vacated 
and remanded the claim brought on behalf of the students' 
rights against search and seizure. 121 After cross-petition for 
allocator, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the 
case. 122 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the 
policy and considered the parental claim moot because no 
parental rights had been impacted in the facts of the case. 123 
In 1998, the Delaware Valley School District adopted a 
drug-testing policy which authorized random, suspicionless 
drug and alcohol testing of students who held parking permits 
or participated in voluntary extracurricular activities. 124 
Students or parents of students participating in extracurricular 
activities or applying for parking permits had to sign a contract 
116. Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 836 A.2d 76 (Pa. 2003) In striking down the 
policy, the court articulated its reasoning, stating that students were forced to "Choose 
one: your Pennsylvania constitutional right to privacy or the chess club." ld. at 95. 
117. ld. at 78. 
118. Id. at 80. 
119. Id. at 82. 
120. Id. 
121. Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 761 A.2d 652 (Pa. Commw. 2000) (en bane), 
aff'd, 836 A.2d 76 (Pa. 2003). 
122. Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 836 A.2d 78 (Pa. 2003). The State Supreme 
Court delayed ruling on the case until the United States Supreme Court resolved the 
Earls case. 
123. ld. at 96. 
124. Id. at 78. 
1] PEE IN A CUP 179 
consenting to testing for alcohol and controlled substances. 125 
The one-year contract authorized school officials to collect 
breath, urine, and blood samples from students, which could 
only be used to test for a specific list of drugs. The policy 
required testing in five different circumstances: (1) initial 
testing, (2) random testing, (3) reasonable suspicion testing, (4) 
return-to-activity testing, and (5) follow-up testing. 126 
In rejecting the policy, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
considered both the Supreme Court precedent under a Fourth 
Amendment analysis, and state specific analysis under article 
I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 127 The 
Pennsylvania Court had previously held that challenges to 
article I, section 8 mandated "greater scrutiny in the school 
environment" and the appropriate test was a four-factor test. 
The test evaluated the students' privacy interests, the nature 
of the intrusion, notice, and the overall purpose to be achieved, 
including the immediate reasons prompting the decision to 
conduct the search. 128 The court reviewed the first three factors 
and did not find any of them determinative, and instead based 
its decision, on the fourth factor. 129 Here, the court found that 
the district failed to prove that a drug problem actually existed, 
or that the means chosen to address the problem would 
actually tend to address it. 130 Despite striking down the policy, 
the court, in dicta, left open the potential that had the policy 
been confined to student-athletes and student drivers, it would 
have been upheld. 131 
125. !d. 
126. Id. at 79. 
127. Id. at 88. Article I, section 8 states "[t]he people shall be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and 
no warrant to search any place or to seize any person of things shall issue without 
describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation subscribed to by the affiant." PA. CONST. ART. I, § 8. 
128. 836 A.2d at 88. 
129. !d. at 90-91. 
130. ld. This is "in stark contrast to Vernonia," where the Supreme Court viewed 
the drug testing as a last-ditch effort to address a pervasive and disruptive drug 
culture where other methods had failed. 
131. Id. at 92 ("In addition, while the policy targeted some students who were involved 
in activities where drug or alcohol use presents an inherent danger (e.g. student-athletes and 
drivers), it included others involved in activities where no such inherent physical danger 
exists (e.g. other extracurricular programs ... such as the National Honor Society) ... Were 
the suspicionless drug and alcohol testing in this case confined to student-athletes and 
students with driving/parking privileges, the question would obviously be closer."). 
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E. The Washington Supreme Court holds Random, 
Suspicionless Drug Testing of Student-Athletes Violates the 
Washington Constitution 
In 2008, the Washington Supreme Court, en bane, held that 
a random, suspicionless drug testing policy, testing student-
athletes, violated article I, section 7 of the Washington State 
Constitution. 132 Parents of high school student-athletes, who 
had consented to the testing, filed suit against the school 
district. 133 The trial court held that drug testing, despite the 
lack of any individualized suspicion, was constitutional. 134 The 
Washington Supreme Court accepted direct review, and held 
that there is no "special needs" exception to the warrant 
requirement that would allow random, suspicionless drug 
testing. For this reason, the district policy was 
unconstitutional. 135 
As a result of drug and alcohol use in the school community, 
the school district implemented random drug testing, requiring 
testing of student-athletes at the beginning of the sport season, 
and then subjected students to random drug testing during the 
remainder of the season. 136 Students were tested by urinalysis, 
and the sample was mailed to an independent lab. 137 If a 
student tested positive for illegal drugs, the student was 
suspended from extracurricular activities. 138 The results were 
not sent to law enforcement or made part of the academic 
record. 139 After the students in this case consented to the 
testing, and were tested, their parents filed suit. 140 
132. York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 178 P.3d 995 (2008). Article I, section 
7 of the Washington State Constitution states, "No person shall be disturbed in his 
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." WASH. CONST. art I, § 7. 
133. York, 178 P.3d at 997. 
134. !d. at 999 (holding "that while that school district's policy 'approached the 
tolerance limit' of our constitution, the policy was, nevertheless, constitutional and 
narrowly tailored to reach a compelling government end."). 
135. !d. at 997. 
136. !d. at 998 (undisputed facts from the trial show that in 2000, 50'% of student-
athletes self-identified as drug and/or alcohol users). 
137. !d. 
138. Id. (the length of suspension depended on the number of infractions and 
whether the student tested positive for drugs or for alcohol). 
139. !d. 
140. !d. 
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The Washington Supreme Court expressed substantial 
deference to the school district, stating that it "loath[es] to 
disturb the decisions of local school board," but ultimately 
observed that it "will not hesitate to intervene when 
constitutional protections are implicated." 141 Initially, the 
Washington Supreme Court distinguished the federal analysis 
under the Fourth Amendment from its own analysis under the 
Washington State Constitution that affords greater protection 
than the U.S. Constitution. 142 The test for determining the 
constitutionality of a search under the Washington 
Constitution has two prongs; first, the court considers if a 
privacy interest is implicated, and then determines if the 
intrusion is satisfied by a valid warrant or meets one of the few 
exceptions. 143 The court in the case at hand held that because a 
"student athlete has a genuine and fundamental privacy 
interest in controlling his or her own bodily functions" the first 
prong was satisfied, thus forcing the court to consider the 
second prong. 144 The court found that unlike the "special 
needs" exception used to permit suspicionless searches in 
federal cases, Washington had a more limited group of 
exceptions including "exigent circumstances, consent, searches 
incident to a valid arrest, inventory searches, the plain view 
doctrine, and Terry investigate stops." 145 
In rejecting the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment 
analysis and its "special need exception" in the school setting, 
the Washington court went so far as to say, "If we were to allow 
random drug testing here, what prevents school districts from 
either later drug testing students participating in any 
extracurricular activities, as federal courts now allow, or 
testing the entire student population?" 146 
141. Id. at 999. 
142. Id. at 1000-01 ("[S]imply passing muster under the federal constitution does 
not ensure the survival of the school district"s policy under our state constitution."). 
143. Id. at 1001. 
144. ld. at 1001-02. 
145. Id. at 1003 (Washington has a long judicial history of striking down 
suspicionless searches, and found no exception applied here.). 
146. Id. at 1006. 
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IV. DRUG TESTING BY SCHOOL DISTRICTS: CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONCERNS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
Analysis of school drug testing programs varies by state. 
Vernonia and Earls have made it clear that a properly designed 
random drug testing program of student-athletes will pass 
Fourth Amendment challenges. Despite the strong precedent of 
Vernonia and Earls, nonetheless, not all random drug testing 
programs will survive state constitutional challenges. Because 
each state has unique constitutional protection, programs that 
pass federal constitutional muster are possibly impermissible 
under stricter state constitutional requirements. 
Vernonia introduced the requirement of "special need," and 
subsequently, some courts struggled with what "special need" 
the district must demonstrate to justify testing student 
athletes. 147 Earls broadened the concept of "special need," 
making it clear that under the Fourth Amendment, schools 
need not wait until they have evidence of a drug "epidemic" in 
order to institute a random drug policy under the Federal 
Constitution. 148 Notwithstanding Earls' broadening of the 
concept of "special need," some state courts still require a 
showing of some 
specialized need before permitting a random, suspicionless 
drug test of student-athletes under the state constitution. 149 
While states evaluate testing programs under their own 
constitutions differently than the Supreme Court evaluates 
programs under the Federal Constitution, review of Supreme 
Court analysis is helpful. Lower courts often turn to standards 
articulated by the Supreme Court in a series of Fourth 
Amendment cases. These criteria to be considered when 
evaluating drug testing programs in schools include: the 
rationale behind the policy and whether the policy is tailored in 
a way to meet that rationale; 150 which substances are tested 
147. Ralph Mawdsley, Random Drug Testing for Extracurricular Activities: Has 
the Supreme Court Opened Pandora's Box for Public Schools?, 2003 B.Y.U. Eouc. & 
L.J. 587, 607. 
148. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 
U.S. 822, 835 (2002) (evidence of the drug problem in Earls was slight, when compared 
with the extreme epidemic present in Vernonia). 
149. Mawdsley, supra note 147, at 620. 
150. Bjorklun, supra note 6, at 920 (citing Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. 
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and how students inform the district of prescription medication 
they are taking; 151 the intrusiveness of actual testing 
procedure; 152 and finally, the punishment administered upon a 
failed drug test. 153 
A. Analysis of School District Random Drug Testing Policies in 
Light of the Fourth Amendment 
In determining whether random drug testing programs of 
student-athletes are legal, courts have used criteria drawn 
from several Supreme Court decisions. While reasonableness is 
the touchstone of constitutionality of a governmental search, 
the Supreme Court has used an extended list of criteria when 
considering random urinalysis drug testing of students. Due to 
its scope, this paper will only consider a few key criteria 
considered in a court's analysis of random, suspicionless drug 
testing programs. 
1. The nature of the school district's interest and the district's 
compelling need for testing 
School districts carry a burden of demonstrating the need 
for testing within their district. Even when the test results 
show drug use percentages comparable to the national average, 
schools may still have a compelling need in light of the impact 
of drug use on athletes. 154 In Schaill v. Tippecanoe County, 31% 
of the baseball team tested positive for drug use, a percentage 
roughly comparable to the use by the public as a whole. 155 
However, the school argued that it had a compelling need for 
drug testing and presented evidence that drugs alter mood, 
motor coordination, and one's pain perception, thus supporting 
the school's claim that the health and safety of athletes and 
cheerleaders is a concern closely associated with drug use. 156 
Supp. 1354, 1363 (Dist. Or. 1992), rev'd, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 515 U.S. 
646 (1995)). 
151. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 659 (1995). 
152. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 
U.S. 822, 832 (2002). 
15.'3. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664 (1995). 
154. Bjorklun, supra note 6, at 918. 
155. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County, 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988). 
156. !d. at 1320. 
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While it appears easy for a district to design a compelling 
need, in Brooks, the court found no compelling need. 157 There, 
the court stated that the district could justify the urinalysis 
program if it provided evidence that participants in 
extracurricular activities were more likely to use drugs than 
non-partiCipants, or that drug use interfered with the 
educational mission more if those students were using. 158 The 
court stated, "The justification for the ... drug testing program 
in essence is that their students would be safer in everything 
they did if they did not use drugs or alcohol. That rationale 
does not meet the compelling need criteria necessary to 
undertake a search without reasonable suspicion." 159 
2. Limiting the scope of the drug testing program, and tailoring 
it to achieve the stated goals 
Courts consider whether programs are limited in scope and 
tailored to achieve their stated goals. They appear to generally 
"uphold drug testing programs limited in scope and designed to 
achieve specific goals as opposed to general efforts to test large 
numbers of students in the hope that such massive testing will 
deter students from drug use generally." 160 Another factor that 
may come into play in future challenges is the actual impact. 
For example, if a policy is designed to deter drug use among 
that student population-as opposed to decreased injuries 
among athletes caused by drug abuse- and drug use is 
climbing, students may have a good argument that the 
program, as designed, is not tailored to achieve its goals. 161 
In Brooks, the court held a policy that tested over half of the 
student body during the first half of the school year, and 
potentially all but thirteen students who ultimately would have 
been tested if the program had been permitted to continue, 162 
157. Brooks v. E. Chambers Consol. lndep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 761 (8. 
Dist. Tex 1989), aff'd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991). 
158. Id. at 764. 
159. Id. at 764-65. 
160. Bjorklun supra note 6, at 920. 
161. Policies vary in goals, from deterrence of general drug use, to preventing 
impaired students from participating, to decreasing problematic behavior at school 
caused by drug use. 
162. Brooks. 730 F. Supp. at 765. Only thirteen students did not participate in 
some sort of extracurricular activity. Id. at 761. 
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was highly intrusive and unlikely to achieve its stated goals. 163 
In contrast, the court in Schaill held that a drug testing policy 
that only tested participants in athletics was sufficiently 
limited in scope. The Schaill court also found the policy was 
designed to enforce its goals regarding the safety and health of 
participants. 164 In Acton, the court compared the policy with 
that in Brooks and found that "[u]nlike the policy ... in Brooks, 
which applied random drug testing to all extra-curricular 
activities, the Vernonia policy is limited ... "to athletics. 165 This 
correlated with the purpose of the policy, addressing student 
safety in athletic programs. From this analysis, it appears that 
courts will uphold testing programs limited in scope, but reject 
those that are "fishing expedition[s]" designed to identify "drug 
and alcohol use to carry on a moral crusade." 166 
3. The diminished expectation of privacy of a student-athlete 
Generally, urinalysis testing is considered more than 
"minimally intrusive." In fact, the United States Supreme 
Court stated that the "excretory function is traditionally 
shielded by great privacy" and there are few activities in life 
more personal or private. 167 Despite this precedent, in 
Vernonia, the Supreme Court determined that random 
urinalysis testing may be a negligible privacy invasion 
depending on the manner in which the sample is collected. 168 
This holding in Vernonia-that drug tests of students usmg 
urinalysis was minimally invasive-conflicts with their 
previous holding that urinalysis of adults is invasive. 169 
When this "minimal intrusion" is paired with a student's 
diminished expectation of privacy, drug tests in schools are 
permitted. In Vernonia, the Court noted that because students 
are "routinely required to submit to various physical 
examinations and to be vaccinated against various diseases," 
163. !d. at 765. One of the stated goals was to prevent impaired students from 
taking part in after school activities. 
164. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1320 (7th Cir. 1988). 
165. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1363 (Dist. Or. 1992), 
rev'd, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
166. Bjorklun, supra note 6, at 920 (citing Vernonia, 796 F.Supp. at 1363). 
167. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 604 (1989). 
168. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 4 7J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657-58 (1995). 
169. This is likely related to the concept that students, while in school, have more 
relaxed constitutional rights than the normal citizen. 
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students cannot reasonably expect normal Fourth Amendment 
protections from invasions like urinalysis testing. 170 Student-
athletes have even fewer privacy expectations, since they 
voluntarily choose to participate in school sports and subject 
themselves to physical exams and additional regulations. 171 
The Court also found it significant that drug tests were kept 
confidential, did not become part of a student's academic 
record, were not turned over to law enforcement, and were 
destroyed after a short period of time. 172 
Critics of drug testing in schools highlight that a similar 
testing of adults would be unconstitutional. Additionally, 
testing only students in sports, presuming their guilt and that 
they are more likely to use to drugs, is unfair. 173 One critic 
noted that students are faced with a catch-22 of sorts, because 
"[i]nvolvement in sports is sometimes an important way for 
students to counteract the negative influences that may 
surround them .... [t]herefore, it is unfair to compel students 
to choose between athletics on one hand and all vestiges of 
privacy on the other." 174 
4. The character of the intrusion; are there less intrusive 
alternatives? 
Courts may also consider whether school districts have 
tried less intrusive methods to discourage drug use; however, 
the Supreme Court has upheld instances of random 
suspicionless drug testing even though less restrictive 
alternatives were available. 175 In Acton, the district had tried 
several educational programs designed to discourage drug use, 
but "the 'subtle' approach not only failed, but seemed to cause 
further disruptions." 176 In Acton, the court concluded that 
"random drug urinalysis testing was ... the next logical step in 
170. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656. 
171. Id. at 657. 
172. Sysol, supra note 7, at 600. 
173. Darrel Jackson, The Constitution Expelled: What Remains of Students' Fourth 
Amendment Rights? 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 673 (Summer 1996). 
174. ld. at 673, 685-86. 
175. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663. 
176. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1363 (Dist. Or. 1992), 
rev'd, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
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a progressive attempt to address the drug and alcohol 
problems." 177 
Critics of drug testing policies have argued for suspiciOn-
based testing. Some fear exists that suspicion-based testing 
may impair relationships between teachers and students, as 
well as students and other students, because testing relies on 
someone "tattling" on another. One critic of current drug 
testing policies argues that a suspicion-based system will not 
create adversarial relationships because "where drug impaired 
students are concerned, those relationships are already 
adversarial." 178 
In addition to considering alternatives, courts have also 
considered the method of collecting the test sample itself when 
determining the reasonableness of the policy. In Earls, the 
court noted that the student was alone during the testing, 
while the faculty member listened outside the stall for the 
"normal sounds of urination." 179 
5. Policy limitations on school district officials' discretion 
An article outlining case law and drug testing policies 
highlighted the discretion of school officials as a key factor in 
evaluating the constitutionality of the random drug testing 
policy. 180 Intuitively, it would seem that the less discretion 
school officials have, the more likely the policy is to stand as 
constitutional. When students are not picked at random using 
a computer or similar method, there may be a presumption 
that the test was in bad faith. To survive court scrutiny, it is 
important to outline and follow testing procedures to ensure 
"that any particular search was not motivated by a desire to 
harass or intimidate." 181 
6. The penalties for failed drug test, criminal or otherwise 
In all the policies reviewed and upheld by the various 
courts, the penalties for a failed drug test were related why 
177. Vernonia, 796 F. Supp. at 1364. 
178. Jackson, supra note 173, at 693. 
179. Bd. of Educ. of lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 
U.S. 822, 831 (2002). 
180. BjorkJun, supra note 6, at 922. 
181. Id. at 921. 
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reason students were tested in the first place. For example, in 
Vernonia, students were suspended from the current season, 
and potentially also from the next season. 182 None of the 
policies appear to involve punishment more severe than 
suspension from extracurricular activities. Students were 
never suspended from school, nor law enforcement ever 
notified. One can assume that if the penalty involved criminal 
action, or a permanent mark on a student's academic record, 
courts might require that the drug testing be based on 
individualized suspicion. 183 
B. The Future of Drug Testing in Schools 
As the Washington case York v. Wahkiakum demonstrates, 
even if a school district drug testing policy passes federal 
constitutional challenges, there may still be state 
constitutional bars to the program. 184 Some states are more 
welcoming to drug testing policies. New Jersey was the first 
state to mandate random steroid testing for high school 
student-athletes through statewide legislation. 185 Other states, 
like Texas, Florida, and Illinois have either considered or 
passed similar legislation. 186 
C. Conclusion 
Today, controversy in the drug testing 
Even the federal government has become 




182. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,666 (1995). 
183. One critic of drug testing notes that suspicionless drug testing tells students 
that they are guilty until proven innocent, and some students "may feel that they are 
treated as second-class citizens" because the courts allow suspicionless testing of 
students when they would not allow it of adults. Jackson, supra note 173, at 695. 
184. York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 178 P.3d 995 (2008). 
185. Lawlor, supra note 7. 
186. Sysol, supra note 7, at 597~98. 
187. Despite questions about the actual effectiveness of random drug testing 
policies and the prevalence of drug problems among high school athletes, the Bush 
administration was supportive of school drug testing. In fact, the "No Child Left 
Behind Act" provides that federal money may be used for school drug testing programs. 
For a report on the prevalence of drug use, and effectiveness of random drug testing 
policies. See ZEESE, supra note 10, § 8:4. To read more about "No Child Left Behind," 
see 20 U.S.C. §4115. As with many facets of education, the federal government provides 
funding and may be able to limit the law that governs. If the funding for the program is 
purely federal, courts may be required to apply federal law. 
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continues, despite mixed results. In 2009, the Texas University 
Interscholastic League released results that they found only 
seven positive results in nearly 19,000 tests of high school 
athletes for steroid use. 188 A Texas state senator was quoted as 
criticizing the drug testing program as a "colossal waste of 
taxpayer money." 189 While this particular program was 
designed only to identify steroid use, it highlights a familiar 
public complaint-if student drug use is the same as the 
national average, even among athletes, then the money might 
be better spent on other programs. But, as a parent of a 
student who committed suicide while battling depression 
potentially related to steroid use observed, "They don't stop 
testing Olympic athletes just because most of them don't test 
positive." 190 
Other arguments show that while student-athlete drug use 
mirrors the national average, there is a greater abuse of 
performance enhancing drugs. 191 Student-athletes do not only 
use drugs to enhance their performances, but also use them to 
fight fatigue, mask pain, and cope with the increased stress of 
being a student-athlete. 192 Also, when compared to the drugs 
used by the general student population, drugs used by student-
athletes are more harmful and have a greater probability of 
reaching epidemic proportions. 193 
Drug testing is perhaps not the only remedy available to 
school officials in deterring drug use and protecting student 
safety, but schools lack an infinite continuum of alternatives. 194 
Courts have emphasized that schools should try alternative 
policies first, and resort to drug testing as a last resort. At this 
point, the case law seems clear that due to the volunteer nature 
of high school athletics, the physical nature of sports and the 
need for mental sharpness to ensure safety during sporting 
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competitions, random drug testing of student-athletes by school 
districts is permitted. 
Sara Young 
